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Introduction
E-commerce has been big business for many
years before the internet and has happily existed
across borders and between countries within
traditional laws and business practices. However,
with the emergence of internet commerce, the
concept of authentication has encompassed new
challenges that derive from the relatively narrow
avenues for information and the significant
potential risks inherent in an on-line
environment. The problem of authentication in
the on-line world goes to the heart of trust and
therefore confidence-building for internet
commerce and all of its benefits.
Until recently it seemed that lawyers and technologists
were evolving some sort of consensus about on-line
authentication. This consensus was, however, by no
means unanimous, and contradictory threads can be
found in both the legal and technology literature.
Somewhat independently of both the law and
technology has been business practice that has, to a
large degree, ignored developments in both of these
areas and more often relied on traditional
authentication processes and risk management. It
would be incorrect to presume that this continued
reliance on traditional authentication by business has
been a symptom of conservative management. Instead
it has been a reflection of the way business actually
works. Authentication in commerce usually derives
from relationship management, and relationship
management in commerce, just as in society generally,
is a complex entanglement of the numerous factors
that define human behaviour. Similarly the
management of commercial relationships involving
significant risks is unlikely to be dictated by technology
or the law. Instead, this relationship management is a
third parameter in addition to the law and technology,
which between them define the business environment.
This paper discusses how, within this commercial
environment, and within the context of authentication,
it is technology that is most at risk of a role crisis. In
the internet environment, authentication technologies
do have a role to play but in the interests of both e-
commerce and the technologies themselves, the limits
of this role need to be more carefully defined and
measured if full confidence in the applications is to be
assured.
Evolution of the law
With the emergence of new means of communication
and the transfer of information, business methods have
evolved to take advantage of the speed, efficiencies,
and cost benefits of on-line technologies.
These developments have occurred in spite of
existing barriers to the legal efficacy of records and
documents that exist solely in electronic media.
Whether the legal requirement that information or an
agreement or contract must be contained or set forth
by pen and paper derives from a statute of frauds
affecting the enforceability of an agreement, or from a
record retention statute that calls for keeping the paper
record of a transaction, such legal requirements raised
concerns for the evolving business environment and its
efficient use of electronic media.
In the 1990s, countries acknowledged the need to
keep pace with business practice, and developed
electronic legal frameworks to assure that electronic
records and signatures would be treated in the same
manner, under existing law, as written records and
manual signatures. The new rules on electronic
commerce have tried to avoid the old rule obstacles,
especially where these required “handwritten
signatures”, the “written form” and the “original”. The
principal goal of these new rules has been to facilitate
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electronic commerce, rather than to replace the old civil
and commercial laws. These new electronic commerce
frameworks are complementary with the traditional laws.
These new legal electronic frameworks have been
well documented elsewhere and can be summarised in
terms of their removal of old rule obstacles as well as
providing legal recognition of:
• electronic records and digital documents
• electronic signatures.
Both concepts constitute the essential backbone of the
electronic legal framework. The validity of electronic
records, or digital documents, allows the legal
engineering that is needed in the systems applications.
In these reforms, the concept of an “original” document
is addressed, and the recognition of the “written form”
clarified. Almost all the electronic laws recognize that
an electronic record or digital document is as valid as a
paper document, and that it satisfies the requirement
of written form, also that an electronic record or a
digital document may be considered as originals, in
fact, that their copies may be originals too.
E-commerce rules have established, to the greatest
extent possible, the equivalency of electronic
signatures and manual signatures. Therefore the term
“signature” has been used to connote and convey that
equivalency. The purpose has been to overcome
unwarranted biases against electronic methods of
signing and authenticating records.
However, from a traditional legal perspective, a
signature has never meant to convey notions of
security: the signature was always to convey the idea
of intent. As to whether the intent seemingly attached
to a document is genuine, this was another matter
addressed by the statutes on fraud, the evidentiary
weight of the document, the signature and potentially
other supporting evidence. Thus a fully scripted ink
signature would seem to carry more evidentiary weight
than chop marks, but both are equally valid means of
conveying intent.
For e-commerce there is a wide range of alternative
signatures, between the use of bionics, the use of
passwords based on symmetric cryptography, up to the
use of public key technology, with digital certificates
issued by a non licensed certification authority.  A
digital signature using public key encryption
technology (also cited as PKI in this article) would
qualify as an electronic signature, as could the mere
inclusion of one’s name as a part of an e-mail message
- so long as in each case the person signing executed
or adopted the symbol with the intent to sign.
The first of the new laws reflected a certain lack of
distinction between the notion of intent and the idea of
security. The reason is not hard to find: where the
forensic quality of an ink signature provided substantial
assurance of authentication in traditional commerce
there is no real equivalence in the digital environment,
where the signature application procedure itself must
be secure. Thus security in the digital environment
substitutes for the forensic qualities of the paper-based
environment. The issue of evidence has merely shifted
from, for example, the lithography of the ink signature
to the integrity of security for a digital signature.
These laws were not technologically neutral; they
adopted the use of digital signatures based on public
key certificates as the only alternative to handwritten
signatures. These and subsequent developments may
be grouped into three categories:
Technology specific laws 
The first laws and statutes were not technologically
neutral; they specifically identified technologies,
usually digital signatures, to be used in order to have a
valid electronic signature. Utah was the first US state to
pass such an electronic signature law. Other states
subsequently adopted digital signature specific
statutes or statutes like those containing presumptions
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about “secure electronic signatures”, that require
specific criteria to be met for the signature to be
deemed valid. Thus far, only Digital Signatures or
signatures using Signature Dynamics technology have
been identified as acceptable under such statutes. In
Europe, the first Germany law was like this, as in
Argentina with the Decree for the Federal Public
administration.
Technology preferred laws
Some jurisdictions have adopted laws that appear to
be technology neutral, but provide an evidentiary
presumption in favour of validity if the parties use
specific technologies. Although a specific technology
may not always be expressly identified, in order to be
eligible for the presumption, the “secure electronic
signatures” must meet specified criteria, which only
certain technology (typically, digital signatures) may
satisfy. The principal example is the Directive 99/93
from the European Union on Electronic Signatures.
Also, Latin American laws contemplate legal
recognition of the digital documents, electronic
signatures and digital signatures, in this last case with
a strong presumption associated.2
Technology neutral laws
A majority of American states with electronic records
and signatures laws allow any form of electronic
signature to be binding, so long as the parties have
agreed to the use and type of signature, and the
signing party intended to be bound by the signature. In
those states no specific signature technology is given
prominence over other technologies. This is the scheme
of the American E-SIGN Act that recognizes the legal
validity of the electronic record and the electronic
signature, without a specific association with any kind
of technological tool.
The legal development towards digital signatures
and public key infrastructure seemed to take the law
away from its reliance on traditional statutes of
evidence to assign particular weight to new technology
by itself. This shift derived from the seemingly elegant
solution to on-line authentication developed by
mathematicians and technologists. Weaknesses in
these solutions have gradually become evident, which
together with the relatively slight use made of this
technology by business, has increasingly made public
key-based authentication laws inadequate. This issue
has become increasingly evident with the development
new technologies that can also claim to deliver strong
authentication.
This legal evolution has not in itself generated a
problem in the context of on-line authentication. It is
commonly the case that law follows practice, and so
problems with the law have been symptomatic of
underlying issues within the technologies or business
practices. The law does, however, become part of the
problem when it locks in flawed standards and locks
out new developments.
Recognizing these issues, countries have begun
modifying their approaches, and giving legal
recognition to other ways of authentication in
cyberspace. These other ways are legally known as
“electronic signatures”.  Generally there is now a trend
towards technology neutral laws, as technology
continues to evolve, but almost all the enacted
legislation is based on the UNCITRAL Model laws on
Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures,3 which
has not been entirely technologically neutral.
Recently, UNCITRAL adopted a new draft convention
on the use of electronic communications in
International Contracting. There, UNCITRAL has
returned to the technologically neutral concept of
functional equivalence to the handwritten signature
2 See the Argentine Law on Digital Signatures Nro.
25.506, the Dominican Law on Electronic
Commerce, Electronic Documents and Digital
Signatures Nro. 126-02, the Peruvian Law on
Digital Signatures Nro. 27269, the Brazilian
Provisory Rule Nro. 2200-2, the Chilean Law on
Electronic Signatures Nro. 19.979, the Colombian
Law on Electronic Commerce and Digital
Signatures Nro. 527-1999, the Ecuadorian Law on
Electronic Commerce, Electronic Signatures and
Data Messages, the Venezuelan Law on Message
Data and Electronic Signatures.
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contained in the Electronic Commerce Model Law. The
draft convention on electronic communications
recognizes the validity of any authentication method,
modifying the Electronic Signature Model law criteria.
Technological solutions
On-line authentication is often identified with PKI and
digital signatures, although this is by no means the
only option. There are numerous PKI models and new
models or variations on existing models are inevitable.
Moreover, a PKI may contain elements from more than
one business model, or imperfectly implemented ones.
The focus here is on PKI for simplicity but the
conclusions could apply across any technology.
The PKI approach to the legal validity and security of
electronic transactions has presented various
problems. The issues are well known. Often the PKI
solution effectively transfers the problem of the
association between the key and identity to the
‘trusted authority’. Issues then arise as to how
satisfactory are the processes of the authority, what is
the integrity of the authority, how can there be
assurance that the authority has, knowingly or
unknowingly associated a public key to a false identity.
These issues become public policy and risk
management problems as to the authenticity of the
identity attached to the public key by the Certification
Authority (CA) and the accreditation of the CA itself.
In addition there are the issues surrounding the
security about the secret key itself, as well as its
currency or obsolescence. A list of potential
weaknesses with both security and legal significance
includes:
• Lack of clarity about pre-authentication procedures
• CA based trust
• Lack of warranties
• Certificate revocation issues
• Privacy
Public key deployment
• Insecurity of storage
• Insecurity of timing issues
A survey by the PKI Forum (“PKI Action Plan”, OASIS
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technical Committee (TC),
2004) identified the top five obstacles to PKI
deployment and usage as:
• Software applications do not support it
• Costs are too high
• PKI is poorly understood
• Too much focus on technology, not enough on need
• Poor interoperability
The survey respondents indicated that their most
important applications for PKI were Document Signing,
Secure Email, Electronic Commerce, and Single Sign
On. Document Signing was further broken down into
Signing Forms, Signing Contracts, and Signing
Documents before Dissemination, with roughly equal
interest in each of these subcategories.
Survey respondents were asked to describe in their
own words the causes of the obstacles, and reported
that technical support for PKI is inconsistent,
interoperability is seriously deficient and standards are
inadequate.
PKI provides strong assurance that a message
originated from a device that had access to the
corresponding private key. An associated digital
certificate provides assurance that the Certificate
Authority had grounds in the past for believing that the
private key had some association with the identity
(together with some rights and capabilities of use).
However, PKI does not provide assurances that the
private key was not also available to other identities, or
that the private key application was by the appropriate
identity with informed consent or intent.
In recognition of some of these weaknesses, new
technical and management protocols and standards are
being developed. For example, NIST has developed a
four level authentication standard that engages one,
two and three factor authentication with the use of
tokens in association with CAs.4 This approach
provides much greater protection of the critical secret
key. Other vulnerabilities, such as the reliance on CAs,
remain. The NIST framework, like the EU, endeavours
to set standards on CA processes as well. Progress is
slow and take-up even slower, while the sophistication
of malicious attacks appears to evolve rapidly.
These issues, and the problems listed earlier, are of
an operational nature – specifically in relation to the
secure communication of documentation and the
attachment of digital signatures. Accordingly, they can
be deeply embedded in the business risk management
environment. However, it would seem difficult for a
business executive to have confidence in technological
applications such as authentication when there is:
3 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce, adopted in
1996, and the Model Law on Electronic Signatures,
adopted in 2001.
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• No way to measure risk
• No way to assign accountability
• Therefore no way to handle liability
• Potentially unlimited risk liability, which is 
uninsurable.
When the technology is recast as part of the risk
management framework, it becomes clear that its role
and scope needs to be not just specified but also
quantified if it is to have real meaning. Thus are these
digital signatures satisfactory for transactions up to
$1000 or $100,000 or unlimited? Where does the
liability begin and end and how can insurance be
arranged? If the proponents of the technology cannot
find these answers then confidence and take-up must
remain thin.
Business risk 
Electronic commerce transactions for business and
other applications require a range of qualities
additional to that of clear legal status. For example, the
receiver of an electronic commerce message may seek
assurance about business risk - that the message came
from the purported sender, that no part of the message
has been altered during transmission, and that the
contents of the transaction have been kept confidential.
Thus the requirements of legal validity in e-commerce
are quite different from those for business security, and
confusion between the two has sometimes led to
inappropriate applications of the technology, poor
business models and even a lack of legislative
interoperability. So while it is common to use digital
signature technology to assure confidentiality, for
example for sending encrypted messages, this use has
little relationship with the legal concept of digital
signatures. Thus from a business risk perspective,
where an entity can experience major losses in a matter
of seconds, the fact that a digital signature carries a
rebuttable legal presumption may be of no relevance
whatsoever.
Businesses do not normally incur risks with parties
that they do not trust. To understand the challenge of
on-line authentication, it is necessary to appreciate the
sources of trust that underlies the established
commercial environment. Commercial trust is not a
matter of faith, regulation or technology; it is the
outcome of relationship management. The
development of commercial relationships derives from
traditional business interactions involving a range of
diverse sources and types of complementary
information about the other party including, for
example, meetings, telephone calls, e-mails, credit
checks and networks.
A familiar part of this trust environment is the
signature. The idea of a signature has not traditionally
needed to be specifically defined. For the purposes
both of business risk and legal application, the role of a
signature can be similar. For the management of risk it
may be important to authenticate the origin,
destination and integrity of documentation – the
requirement is to link a document exclusively with an
appropriately authorised intent. These risk
requirements can demand as much information about
the ‘authority’ and ‘intent’ as about the security of
process, both in traditional commerce and in e-
commerce. As for risk management generally, the level
of authentication needs to be commensurate with the
risks involved.
E-Business
The ink signature itself, while not bionic, has a forensic
quality that is relatively difficult to misuse by third
parties, often because this also implies physical access
to hard copy documentation, which in turn resides in
obscure places such as filing cabinets, safes, etc. These
physical stores of documentation will usually be
accessible by only a handful of people.
Much of this traditional risk and trust environment
may seem to have no ready-made equivalent in the on-
line world. Any analysis of these issues in relation to
business in the on-line environment needs first to
distinguish between B2C (business to customer or
retail) and B2B (business to business) or B2G
(business-to-business or business-to-government). In
most cases B2C transactions are less problematic using
established processes involving very limited liabilities
between contracted parties (such as credit card
holders, merchants, credit card vendors and banks).
The liabilities are measurable and limited, which allows
the processes to be insured (generally paid for through
credit card fees). This ‘traditional’ e-commerce
continues to carry the great bulk of e-transactions and
is characterised by closed contractual relationships
between each party. The success of these traditional
closed systems is measurable by their ubiquity and risk
controls.
4 The Electronic Authentication Guideline (NIST,
September 2004), provides technical guidance to
Federal Agencies implementing electronic
authentication. 
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The same comforts do not apply to B2B or B2G
commerce, and the circumstances of these bear little
relationship to the B2C environment. Here there may be
high value internet transactions between unrelated
parties across international borders. For example,
governments are increasingly accepting tenders from
business through the internet. While at the tender
stage there has been no financial transfer, the
intellectual property within a high value technology
tender or even a construction contract can easily be
valued at millions of dollars. Either the business does
not compete or it accepts the use of government
specified PKI/SSL lodgement technology, only some of
which might be regarded as having best practice
security. The government itself may also be assuming a
liability for requiring businesses to use internet
lodgement, although this will be little comfort to
business.
Business should be able to expect but currently
cannot receive an assessment of risk and an associated
insurance or, where uninsurable, be provided with
other arrangements by government or other such
parties. This feature defines the break with the
requirement of business risk management that, unless
resolved, will continue to see B2B authentication
activities often ignore the technology.
Discussion and conclusion
E-commerce represents a fundamental departure from
the traditional trust environment, in that parties are
now expected to trust the process itself, and they may
be expected to derive this trust from a single channel of
information where previously there were multiple
channels. This reality delivers only a weak capacity to
develop commercial trust and magnifies potential risk.
Commercial on-line authentication technologies seem
averse to addressing the issues in ways that would
allow robust risk management. No authentication
process is both practical and foolproof. Accordingly, no
transaction should, from a risk perspective, either
require or presume that it be so.
Risks that cannot be measured cannot be managed,
particularly in the absence of information about 
the nature of the transaction, and therefore
accountabilities cannot be assigned. It seems that
there is therefore unlikely to be a generic solution
applicable to e-commerce generally. Solutions need 
to be developed for specific applications, such as low
value retail sales, versus confidential document
transmission through to high value contractual
commitments.
From a risk perspective, there has in some sense
been underlying anthropic assumptions about
technological capabilities in this e-commerce
environment. Thus in defining the security
requirements of B2B commerce, there has been a
presumption that they, and therefore trust, can be
delivered technologically. If it were assumed instead
that these attributes of trust can not be delivered in
this way, then it is likely that these would not have
been defined as essential requirements, and other
business processes would be developed to make good
the implied deficiencies. Another way of stating this is
that if the technologies cannot deliver adequate
processes to address certain levels of risk, then let this
be transparent and allow business processes to
develop to reduce the risks that the technologies are
being asked to address. To ensure that other solutions
are able to emerge, it is important therefore that
legislation does not lock in just one option that may
have only limited application and that has
vulnerabilities of its own.
Much of the discussion around authentication has
been lead by technologists or lawyers, and the lawyers
have begun to converge on a robust and meaningful
RISK AND LAW IN AUTHENTICATION
Much of the discussion around
authentication has been lead by
technologists or lawyers, and the lawyers
have begun to converge on a robust and
meaningful legal approach to this matter.
18 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW REVIEW www.deaeslr.org
legal approach to this matter. Business managers seem
to have been absent from this discussion. However, the
understanding of the technology and risk is unlikely to
mature until management itself becomes conversant
with this issue given that much of any risk equation of
authentication is off-line and has little to do with either
the law or technology.
In conclusion, the evidentiary status of e-signatures
or digital signatures and authentication techniques
together with the same technologies to manage
business risk and provide confidentiality, integrity and
security have, in principle, valid roles to play to instil
confidence into the business environment. However,
this authentication technology cannot address open-
ended risk, for which multiple channels of
authentication are required. This may be of little
significance to legislators for whom the courts provide
the final redress. On the other hand, for business
executives for whom this can mean the life or death of
their company, neither the law nor technologists can
replace many of the traditional elements of trust
including elements of identity and document
authentication. The issues around PKI will continue to
be unsatisfactory until it matures to the point where it
recognises and measures risk and is able to define
transactions as insurable or uninsurable. This problem
is intractable only so long as PKI is kept aloof from risk
management, presumably in an effort to strengthen
confidence in it. In the B2B environment the
consequences are instead likely to be an erosion of
confidence. This requires, like so much else in the
business world, that risks be assessed and liabilities be
assigned, or where liabilities cannot be assigned then
risks be re-engineered.
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